ABSTRACT: This study investigates inflation persistence in annual CPI inflation collected between 1994 and 2014 for 46 African countries.We group these countries into panels according towhether they are inflation targeters or not and conduct estimations for preandpost inflation targeting periods. Interestingly enough,we find that inflation persistence was much higher for inflation targeters in periods before adopting their inflation targeting regimes and inflation persistencedropped by 40 percent for these countriesafter adopting the policy frameworks.For non-inflation targeters inflation persistence has increased by almost 290 percent between the two time periods.
Introduction
Commitment to price stability forms the epitome of modern day monetary policyand Central Banksworldwide have undertaken this commitment, either by statutory mandates or by designated exercises of discretion (Phiri, 2016) . It thus comes as no surprise that a considerable number of industrialized economies have entirely committed their monetary policy efforts towards adopting explicit inflation targeting regimes. However, such inflation targeting frameworks are less favoured in developing or emerging economies and this case becomesexceedingly obvious when taking into consideration African countries, in which only two countries (i.e. South Africa and Ghana) have explicitly adopted inflation targeting regimes as official monetary policy mandates. Naturally, this is a thought-provoking ordeal considering thatinflation targeting is virtuous in curbing inflation expectations and lowering inflation volatility.Moreover, inflation targeting is built upon pillars like credibility, transparency, independence and accountability, which, in turn, are attributes of monetary policy necessary to ensure a stronger financial environment for African economies.
Regardless of whether Central Banks opt to adopt inflation targeting regimes or not, one thing remains certain; all monetary authorities wish to exert some level of control over prevailing levels of inflation. One particular attribute of the inflation process which serves as a guideline in determining whether Central Banks have appropriate control over inflation, relates to the amount of persistence found in the inflation process. As conveniently noted by Phiri (2012) , an inflation process exhibiting low levels of persistence reflects a financial environment in which policymakers can control the inflation process.Conversely, high levels of inflation persistence signal the inability of Central Banks to control inflation such that any deviations of inflation from its steady-state will ensure that inflation does not easily adjust back its long-run equilibrium.The notion of inflation persistence can be theoretically traced tosticky price modelsand represents an inherent feature of staggered prices or wage contracts (Srinivasan and Kumar, 2012) .Empirically, a popular measure of inflation persistence is the sum of regression coefficients (SARC) obtained after estimating an autoregressive (AR) model of inflation. If the SARC is equal to or above unity, then inflation is rendered to be highly persistent, and if the SARC is below unity, then inflation is not persistent.
In our study, we employ panel-data estimation techniques to evaluate inflation persistence for 46 African countries.We consider this research as being worthwhile since, to the best of our knowledge, no other study has conducted a panel data analysis of inflation persistence solely for African countries. Furthermore, we spilt our sample data into twocategories, namely; inflation targeting and non-inflation targeting countries. The rationale behind examining inflation persistence between the two sets of datais quite simple. If inflation targeters are found to exhibit lower levels of inflation persistence in comparison to non-inflation targeters, then inflation targeting in African countries provides Central Banks with a greater degree of control over the inflation process. If the opposite holds true, then inflation targeting is not suited for African countries and other alternativemonetary policy frameworks, such as exchange rate targets, are more compatible for African countries.
Against this backdrop, the rest of the paper is arranged as follows. The next section presents the data whereas the third section outlines the methodology used in the study. The fourth section presents the empirical results whilst the paper is concluded in the fifth section.
Data
The data used in the empirical part of the study consists of the annual rate ofchange in 
Methodology
In following Bleaney and Francisco (2005) ,we specify the following panel ARregressionof inflation (π t ) as:
Where e i is a country fixed effect, u t is a time fixed effect and v it is the idiosyncratic error term. Countries are indexed by i and time by t. From equation (1) 
Empirical Results
Tables 1, 2 and 3 report our empirical estimation results for the full sample period, the pre-inflation targeting period and the post-inflation targeting period, respectively. In referring to Table 1 , we note that for the full sample period of 1994 to 2014, inflation persistence is more than 5 times lower for non-inflation targeters(i.e. = 0.14) in comparison to inflation targeters (i.e. = 0.72). A similar result is also recorded in Table 2 for the pre-inflation period of 1994 to 2002, in which inflation persistence is approximately 5 times lower for noninflation targeters((i.e. = 0.13) than for inflation targeters (i.e. = 0.75). Table 3 Firstly, overall inflation in African countries has not been very persistent throughout the last two decades. Secondly, non-inflation targeters experienced lower levels of inflation persistence in pre-inflation targeting periods and yet this result was reversed in post-inflation targeting periods. Lastly, in transcending from the pre-inflation period to the post-inflation targeting period, inflation targeters reduced their inflation persistence by 40 percent whereas the levels of persistence in non-inflation targets has increased by more than 290 percent. targeters and non-inflation targeters, respectively. Significance codes: 1% "***", 5% "**" and 10% "*" and p-values are reported in parentheses. # on the evaluation tests indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis. 
